lokalé forhold, omend indvandringen er et nyt indslag i den socialgeografiske struktur. Bolligmædet og dets forhold har, i kombination med den almuncelige velstandsstigning, imidlertid resulteret i en geografisk polarisering mellem byområderne.


English summary “The changing social geography of big cities”

The immense economic, social and political changes in European metropoles during the last decades have reactualised the study of intra urban social differentiation. In particular, globalisation has become a centrepiece in the discussion of current social changes. The general understanding of current social changes in big cities is based on the effects of globalisation. The globalisation process on the one hand implies a removal of barriers to trade and investments that expose industry and government to external competition. This does often result in growing differences between regions and cities and between social groups. On the other hand, the pressure from outside necessitates a reduced welfare spending in favour of improved competitiveness. This forces governments to deregulate their economy and open markets for competitiveness. It does also forces governments to accept a rising differentiation of income as a result of the economic restructuring. Both reactions are interlinked and lead to rising inequality in society. The well paid and stable jobs in the Fordist manufacturing industry are replaced by part time contracts in the service sector with a minimum of social security. The outcome of the economic restructuring is growing inequality as the service industry of metropolitan areas either belongs to more simple service industry using predominantly unskilled workers, while the business services employs a range of highly trained specialists. This dualism is the root of social polarisation within the postindustrial society.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, we have witnessed several important attempts from governments to regain their hold on the social and economic development. First of all have governments strove to expand their governing capacity by reorganising the institutional structures. This implies usually a general shift in governing style from governing by rules and procedures to governing by network. However, the change does also shift focus of politics from welfare-related issues, redistribution and social balance towards competitiveness and growth strategies. The removal of national barriers for flows of capital, commodities and labour forces nation states and regions to counteract the external competition. An intensification of local economic policy has been a usual answer along with the development of a more proactive urban policy (Judd & Parkinson, 1990). This shift in policy style has been described as a shift “from managerialism to entrepreneurialism” (Harvey, 1989b).

The debate was triggered by Sassen’s tempting book ‘Global cities’ (Sassen, 1991) that claims that observed urban changes, in particularly in down town districts, economic restructuring and social change are all part and share in globalisation. Moreover, she claims that the demise of national borders removes more than customs, it removes the existing national urban hierarchy and opens up for the emergence of a new system of leading metropoles (‘global cities’) at global scale. The global orientation does also mean that different social and urban structures develops. Sassen in particularly pointed at the income and employment polarisation as features of global cities. In turn, the global cities are rebuilt in accordance with the economic and social transformations.

The argumentation for a social polarisation as a hallmark for postindustrial societies in an era of globalisation was taken for granted by most observers (e.g. Mollenkopf & Castells, 1991; Fainstein & Harloe, 1992). However, few of these claims are based in empirical evidence except studies of income that demonstrated rising levels of inequality and thus seemed to confirm the polarisation thesis. Most of the early studies were American, but despite this polarisation and its causes were formulated as universal phenomena. However, it soon appeared to be difficult to find examples of income polarisation is Europe. In
most cases income became more unequal distributed, the reason for this different European social development was found in the construction of the welfare state (Hannett, 1996). Thus welfare was understood as the main reason for maintaining a higher level of social cohesion. Also in relation to segregation in Western European cities difference in welfare regimes was considered to be of major importance (cf Musterd & Ostendorf, 1998). The polarisation debate led to an expected parallel in terms of socio-spatial polarisation and an interest for comparative research regarding segregation in million cities.

The theme of this thesis is the sociogeographic transformation of western European cities during the late 20th century. This is a period of major social change of Western Europe. The central issue of this thesis is how these social transformations, including globalisation, have altered the internal structures of the cities during the last two decades. Closely related to this is the question of whether the transformation is due to internal or external causes (the former refers to local or national topics while the latter refers to globalisation and other international features). The immigration during second part of the 20th century has specific importance for the social structuration of cities.

The basic claim behind social polarisation is that economic restructuring has led to an almost complete deindustrialisation of many metropoles and the development of a service and knowledge-based economy in stead. The industrial shift is the core of the issue which alters the labour market and increases social differences, sometimes even a direct decline of the middle class. At the same time a growing part of the population is excluded from the labour market according to the debate. However, no such social changes have been demonstrated in Denmark or in Copenhagen (Andersen, 2002; og Andersen, 2003). The thesis therefore does not study the existence of social polarisation but focuses on the segregation including the development of enclaves and ghettos.

Secondly, globalisation often has been presented as a major cause behind the changing social geography of metropoles compared with more local issues (urban politics, institutional arrangements, composition of population). Thirdly, housing markets and housing policy have passed through a period of deep changes in most of the north/west European million cities. In turn, this has had a major impact on segregation and created a stronger segmentation of the housing market. The apparently stability of the urban social structure at district and even neighbourhood level disguises major changes at small area level leading to a remarkable polarisation between the areas. This change of scale for segregation processes appears to be a general feature of the metropoles in this analysis.

Copenhagen is the only Danish city of international importance. However, the city contains many similarities with other north/west European cities in its development, policy and recent social transformations. The other cities in focus here are Hamburg, Hannover, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Haag, Rotterdam, Oslo and Stockholm. They are all located close to Copenhagen and in countries with comparable social structures. Major conclusions then can be transferred from one city to another. A central issue is whether the present metropolis, the postindustrial city, has developed a different socio-spatial structure than the former industrial city? The question is in other words if the deep transformations of the industrial functions of cities have created a new kind of city, i.e. a city organised in a different way than the modern city? Has the relevance of the model presented by Murdie (1969) expired or is it still a valid construction?

This summary will thus, in the following section, give an overview of the theoretical considerations regarding urban social structuring of metropoles and outline the discussion about relations between globalisation, economic and social restructuring and changing social differentiation. The third section brings empirical evidence from eight selected million cities in north western Europe during the last twenty years: Rotterdam, Haag, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Hannover, Hamburg, Oslo and Stockholm. The latter two will be examined at a greater detail than the former cities. Finally, the general characteristics of the social geography of Copenhagen is outlined in order to compare the development of Copenhagen with other north-west European cities. This outline of urban social structure is then used as a background for a detailed study of recent changes of the socio-spatial structuration of Copenhagen. This analysis is based on small, homogeneous urban areas containing typically 500 - 1500 inhabitants. These areas are classified according to the balance between high and low earning groups. The fourth section of the summary concludes that despite the obvious deep structural changes both in the economy and employment due to globalisation, the overall socio-spatial structure of north-west European cities remain unchanged. The only important shift is the immigrants who often are located in less attractive parts of the cities. However, when the social composition of the population is studied at a small area level (a few blocks), then social changes have an impressing level and direction: Towards socio-spatial polarisation.

Urban social differentiation

The scientific interest for social geography emerged in the wake of industrialisation and urbanisation. The fast growing cities of the late 19th century and their vast differences in living standard. The industrial cities all had large number of people living at existence minimum, a fact that initiated a public interest for this field. While the social conditions in Great Britain led to an audit commission that documented the state of social problems, Germany and USA developed a theoretical discussion of the issue. The German sociologists, Weber, Tönnies and Simmel, discussed social consequences of the destruction of the traditional farming community and the rise of a modern, rational and industrialised society (from ‘Gemeinschaft’ to ‘Gesellschafter’). This was not only a question of migrations from the country side to the fast growing cities, it was an economic shift, a political and cultural change, but even a change of the human itself from part of a community woven into tradition and familiar relations to a rational, secularised individual.

American sociology became leading during the first decades of the 20th century and for social geography in particular, the work by Park and Burgess offered the first explanation of the socio-spatial structure of a city by their famous concentric model. They argued that human society was not different from any other societies of animals or plants and that the more powerful individuals will gain the most attractive localities. For the supporters of the Chicago school or human ecologists, the basic principle was the close relationship between the biotic and the physical spheres. Most of their conclusions came from detailed studies of Chicago around 1920, a fast growing city due to high numbers of immigrants. The immigration was seen as a major dynamic factor behind urban development.

Later studies of big American cities concluded that the concentric, social pattern of cities was at best only a part of the story: Hoyt (1939) demonstrated the existence of radial sectors of specific segments of the population. Another important study was the ‘Social Area Analysis’ by Shaw & McKay (1942). The study was a detailed analysis of enumeration districts in San Francisco; the study generalised the social changes into three dimensions: Social rang, urbanisation and ethnicity (originally segregation).

These classic studies were reformulated in an influential paper by Murdie (1969) who furthermore related the effects of the urban physical structures to the socio-spatial differentiation. While the theory has been heavily criticised, the model in general still provides an usable description which fits to empirical
tests. Thus, it is tempting to see the model as a model of the modern society. During the development of social geography, American theory and research issues has become clearly dominating and most research is rooted in US-American debate even when local conditions are substantially different. Despite this accept of the model formulated by Murdie, newer attempts to catch up recent socio-spatial changes have been launched. A particularly important reformulation of human ecology was made by Davies (1984), who argued for a rising number of dimensions of social differentiation. While the modern society had such four dimensions - social rank, family status, ethnicity and immigration - the post modern society develops more such dimensions: Young adults, late family anc non-affluence which further complicates the social structuration of the urban space. The economic restructuring, technological progress as well as social and demographic changes produces more independent dimensions, e.g. welfare dependencies, poverty nd elderly. Such growing differentiation does also mean a stronger dependency and need for public welfare.

Another study of the location of marginalised groups within larger cities (Winchester & White, 1988), saw five major causes behind the emerging excluded spaces: First of all the economic restructuring, declining manufacturing industry and growing services excluded a large number of former industrial workers. Second, shifting demographic structures, rising average age of the population, growing share of single person households and immigrants increases the number of weak households. Third, modification of existing welfare programmes in order to limit the costs, in particularly to avoid passive reception of various forms of social benefits. Fourth, a changing ideology in society, which supports ownership housing, private solutions and insurances in relation to health, unemployment, pension and so on. Fifth, the changes of the housing market that have further concentrated marginalised groups in certain estates and parts of the urban districts: Either peripheral non-profit estates from the 1960s and 1970s or older, traditional, not yet improved residential neighbourhoods in the inner city. Winchester & White (1988) identified three categories of marginalised groups: Those economic marginalised, i.e. excluded from a normal consumption level. Those socially marginalised, i.e. groups whose behaviour is considered to be unacceptable, e.g. criminals, immigrants, disabled, and thus are discriminated. And those who are legally marginalised, e.g. illegal immigrants, prostitutes, drug abusers. These groups have traditionally been located in the less attractive parts of the inner cities. However, improvement schemes and gentrification have pushed the marginalised groups out of their traditional localities and often forced them to settle in peripheral public sector housing.

Wacquant (1996) points to the changing identity of the former praised public housing estates in the outskirts of the cities. Once the pride of the working class, now deteriorated into a ghetto of excluded groups: Immigrants, economic inactive, poor, divorced people. These estates have become non-placed; they do not provide their inhabitants with a feeling of belonging but a need to escape. The clear perception of the estates as tolerated, but not accepted, as locales of no identity and sometimes even violence and evilness, has destroyed the status of the neighbours as places: They have become non-places, spaces of no belonging. Spaces to avoid.

The social geography of Copenhagen was studied for the first time by Pedersen (1967) for 1950 and 1960. He divided the city into 76 areas and used 17 variables including age of the population, labour market position, economic activity rate and average size of household. On basis of a factor analysis he constructed three variables to explain the socio-spatial patterns. Socio-economic status, urban status and growth and mobility. The two former factors showed a sectorial and a concentric pattern, while the latter was related to the specific suburbanisation process of Copenhagen at that time. A more detailed study was made by Matthiessen (1972 & 1975) using a small statistical unit only available in City of Copenhagen. 20 variables including demography, employment and housing conditions were used in the analysis. The results demonstrated the dominance of socio-economic status and family status to explain the socio-spatial structure. However, since then broad studies of the social structure of Copenhagen are missing despite the former expanding suburban areas now faces stagnation or decline as the population grow older and the young families settle in other parts of the city. The only parts of the change that have been noticed is on the one hand the improvement of former working class districts of the inner city and on the other hand the degeneration of larger, suburban estates from the 1970s. Both changes have led to formulation of an urban policy that can cope with the socio-economic effects. It has become clear that the planning system could guide urban growth during the expansion phase, but has lost most of its efficiency as the growth of the city in terms of space ended. In stead, housing policy has become more important instrument a long the new urban political instruments.

The current transformation of big cities is a complex phenomenon and thus there is no general agreement about how to grasp the changes. On the one side is the city the most evident expression for the merging postindustrial society, but on the other hand is it an important part of the changes itself. The social relations of the cities have changed in important ways, firstly a rising inequality in terms of employment, income and other labour market issues (e.g. insurance, contracts, pension scheme). This rise in labour market differentiation is supposed to be a consequence of economic restructuring and globalisation. Secondly, new forms of inequality are evolving, inequalities that are less dependent on employment and income, but depends on age, education, ethnicity and life style. Thirdly, social differentiation produces new socio-spatial patterns, which leaves the overall pattern unchanged (at district level), but enlarge differences between small areas (a few blocks or an estate). Here, housing conditions and ownership forms central factors for organising the social pattern of cities. This is clear in relation to income and employment, but in particular in relation to demographic situations and ethnicity. The rising segregation level observed at the very local level seems first of all to be generated by the affluent households who have a choice at the housing market. These considerations lead to five major issues of concern in relation to the theme of this thesis:

Firstly, the social structures and institutions are in a constant position of evolution through social practice. The institutions and structures are formed and developed in relation to labour market and industry. Thus it is worth to consider whether the structures created for and maintained by the industrial society, still is decisive for social differentiation at present, including the socio-spatial differentiation of big cities. It is a tempting proposal that the transition from industrial to service society imposes changes of the social relations and indirectly in the structuration of cities. Will the emergence of a knowledge based society, involving a different demand for labour, more differentiated forms of wages and other labour market relations, eventually produce a new form of social inequality that restructures the social landscape of the cities? So far is it the best educated and paid who have benefited from the shifts, while unskilled workers suffer from high unemployment rates and low income. This creates a growing gap between the successful employees and the marginalised groups, whose attachment to labour market is more insecure.

Secondly, since the early 1990s, globalisation has been the preferred explanation of the general transformations. In particularly, this has led to a social political shift towards economic development and workforce as the most suitable way of achieve the required competitiveness. From the beginning globalisation has
The other line of arguments have their point of departure in the many and significant changes since the 1970s, where the effects of economic and institutional changes reduces existing social divides. Yet, this does only mean that other divisions become important and it is these other social divides which form the basis of the new social inequality. Social class and occupation category is still important, but others have appeared, e.g. age, ethnicity and life style. A major representative for this view is Schulze (1993). Harddie (1990) argues for a middle position, that allows the development of a new set of social divides due to horizontal differentiation, but without denying the importance of occupation and income. Harddie concludes that there is basically nothing new about the ‘new’ social inequality, except perhaps the surprise among researchers that so many social changes have taken place without remove inequality. In the end Harddie accept some kind of different inequality due to the processes of individualisation and increasing socio-cultural variation which he considers to have their roots in the 1960s.

The debate about changing forms of social differentiation had furthermore been connected to the discussion of postindustrial societies by Bell (1973) who argued for a meritocracy, where a rising number of occupations would demand advanced skills. This discussion has been taken further in the argumentation for a postindustrial revolution (Andersson og Strømquist, 1988). This involves a transformation of the production from dominated by capital investments into equipment and buildings to a system consisting of flexibility and creativity. This new economy is titled the C-society - creativity, communication, culture and competence. This change will emphasis research and education as the main forces of economic and social development.

The vast growth of the service sector has forced the theoretical debate to consider the middle class as an important group in itself and not just a residual, which neither belongs to the working class or the capitalist class. Harloe & Fainstein (1992) concludes that both London and New York have had a clear rise in the upper-middle class, a stagnation of the rest of the middle class and working class decline in terms of manufacturing and transportation, but growth within services. However, to this they add an underclass, closely linked to the growth of ghettoes/social deprived areas. Thus, Harloe & Fainstein argues for a three-divided society, whose first level is the traditional upper class, that owns the means of production, and the new service class (upper middle class), which leads public and private business. The second class segment is the rest of the middle class and the skilled part of the working class, while the third class segment consists of the unskilled workers and the excluded groups. There are several attempts to “translate” these social changes into a changed social geography (Musterd & Ostendorf, 1998; Borgergård et al, 1998; Friedrichs, 1998; Andersen & Ern, 1999). However, most such studies are more concerned with the social extremes - ghettos or gentrification. The changes of social geography is rarely studies in broader relation, i.e. related to a metropolitan view of the changes. Thus, the study of current socio-spatial changes appears to be partial, perhaps as a result of a somewhat mechanical perception of the relationship between social relations and spatial structures.

The widely used concepts of polarisation, fragmentation and dual society (Loughlin & Friedrichs, 1996; Musterd & Ostendorf, 1998) does not bring much clarity. Unless these concepts are explicitly outlined they remain blurred. Pahl (1988) discussed possible changes of the social structure and found that social polarisation could take different forms: A simple and most often assumed form of polarisation is that of growing upper and lower classes, while the middle class is diminishing. But alternatively social polarisation can refer to a situation where a dominant middle class, based on double earnings and home ownership, separates itself from declining lower strata. They are
sliced off and find themselves outside normal life expectations.

The debate between Sassen (1991), Hamnett (1996a) and Burgers (1996) about the global cities and their social transformation demonstrated the need for precise definitions and more empirical studies before any substantive conclusions are drawn. As Hamnett (1996a) points out, there is quite a difference between income and wages, just as the unit study can be individuals, but it can also be households. Again, the choice made has decisive impact on the conclusions. Finally, it should be noticed that income inequality is only one kind of social difference, others are rarely been detailed studied. Occupation, education, health, age are other important issues here.

The most difficult topic in relation to an analysis of socio-spatial polarisation is the concept itself. The content of the concept is not at all explicit given, in most cases polarisation is supposed to be a widening gap between several groups. But sometimes it is just a question of a gap between two segments of the population. A simple, but acceptable definition of polarisation is a frequency distribution whose middle is diminishing in favour of both extremes. All sorts of rising inequality is thus not polarisation.

The dominant explanation of the phenomenon is based in economic restructuring and subsequent impact on labour market organisation and conditions, including marginalisation of parts of the labour force. However, whether this de facto also turns out to produce socio-spatial changes is more difficult to outline. The relationships between economic change and socio-spatial structure is more complex than most discussions seem to recognize (van Kempen, 1994). The direct effect of industrial change is obvious when firms are closed and the workforce becomes unemployed. Yet, most workers will find new jobs or retire and the impact on income and spending is unclear just as the effect on residential location is impossible to deduce. Moreover, although there are good arguments for a decreased importance of formal education and income in relation to social position, due to rising flexibility and mobility at the labour market, other features have gained in weight such as age, gender and ethnicity. Finally, many changes in occupational position are not an automatic impact on the individual course of life. Insurances against unemployment and disability, family and social network and other social structures reduce such direct relationships that could explain social geographic changes of the city (cf. Lovering, 1997). Any mechanical relationship between labour market position and location is implausible as the differentiation of household types and size as well as household preferences modify this link. Furthermore, the housing market and its regulation, including various programmes to provide low rent dwellings for the poor, helps to eliminate such a connection. Also the built environment of the city dampen the immediate effects of changing economic structures and labour market transformations.

The urban social structure of Copenhagen and north west European metropoles

The socio-spatial structure of the north west European cities has remained notable unchanged despite the major changes of economic, social and political conditions. The overview of the social geography in eight cities demonstrates more than anything that continuity rather than a break has been the development pattern. However, there are four related issues which should be accentuated:

- Most of the cities have in periods relatively high unemployment levels due to the drastic changes of the industrial structure. This unemployment has hit immigrants and refugees. Moreover, the changes of labour market had marginalised relatively large segment of the workforce, especially immigrants and unskilled workers. In particular Stockholm shows a strong reduction in economic activity among the immigrants. Related to this is a substantial change in income distribution in both Oslo, Amsterdam and Stockholm towards more inequality. Thus, it is surprisingly that the same cities do not reveals rising levels of segregation in general, although the high income groups have become more segregated than the low income groups during the last two decades.
- Housing conditions appears at a general level to be the decisive reason behind the urban social geography of the cities. The housing market and its socio-economic importance is closely related to the welfare state. Due to rising financial problems, most countries in the north west of Europe have reduced their spending on housing issues during the last 25 years or so. In some countries with the national housing policy has promoted ownership housing, e.g. Britain and the Netherlands, while other countries have turned to more market oriented forms of regulation, e.g. Sweden. Together with a rise in general prosperity, this shift in policy has increased the ownership sector, but also sharpened the contrast between social or non-profit rental and ownership housing. A growing part of the rental sector is now populated by immigrants, singles, low income groups, retired, disabled and other non-working groups while the private owned dwellings primarily consists of families, employed, high earning groups etc. This divide is labelled socio-tenureal polarisation (Hamnett, 1984).
- A most important change has taken place within the demographic relations: The age composition of the population in different parts of the cities has shifted slowly over many years and thus replaced the former balance between suburbs and inner cities. During the suburbanisation phase, young middle class families left the central cities to in favour of modern and spacious housing, while the elderly part of the population was left behind. During the last thirty years, the population of the suburbs have grown older and the youngsters have moved to older, unmodern and cheap flats in the inner city. This has raised the number of single person households in several cities. The most important issue in relation to demographic changes is the location of immigrants and refugees. They are located either in derelict, inner city neighbourhods ("zone of transition") or in newer, peripheral estate, in most cases in social housing, that occasionally has turned in to ghetto-like settlement.
- Urban policy, which previously consisted of demolishing derelict residential areas and construct modern housing in stead, has shifted to a broader strategy in order to improve the general conditions of the local population and not only the dwellings. However, in many cases the public financed programmes have accelerated the segregation processes by pushing low income groups out of the inner cities and later attracted middle class groups to the then refurbished housing. More recently has this effect on the social composition been a formulated purpose of housing and urban policy in order to develop the potentials of the city in territorial competition.

There are no signs of drastic changes in the general segregation pattern in any of the eight cities studied here. In other words has the social geography of the industrial or modern city survived the transformation to the service and knowledge based society. One reason for this can be the exaggeration of social changes during the last decades. Another is the impact of the urban structures themselves, cf Baumgard & Hall, 2000: The enormous investments into the built envi-
rnonment have long term impacts on social relations and location patterns. The existence of mostly small and dense, multi storey dwellings in the inner cities may provide the neighbourhoods with a certain charm, but it does not provide sufficient space for families who can afford the detached housing in suburban areas. Thus, once constructed, the built environment will conserve a particular household composition in different parts of the cities.

The social geography of Copenhagen has developed in a similar manner as the north west European cities. The overall structure, that is at municipal and district levels, has remained the same during the last few decades. The age composition of the population has changed radically during the period after 1970. At the start of the period suburban areas were inhabited by young families and thus a large number of children, while the inner city districts had a declining number of children and youngsters and rising share of elderly, cf figures 5.2 - 5.4. In the mean time the old generation in the inner city has passed away and been replaced by youngsters from the suburbs. Moreover, the suburban population is now reaching the age of retirement and the age structure of the city is thus turned around. This shift in age composition has tremendous impact on demand for welfare services and local financing through taxation, but it is more than anything a consequence of ageing of the population, not globalisation or similar macro level processes. A another important demographic change is the growth in number of foreign citizens. 1980-99 was the number doubled, however, the segregation level for non-western citizens was reduced a bit while the Turkish immigrants became a bit more segregated, see table 5.7. The spatial distribution of third world citizens in the Copenhagen region reveals a clear north - south west divide: To the north is the share of third world immigrants quite low while the largest shares are found in central Copenhagen and the western suburbs (figure 5.12).

The contrast between the more affluent northern parts of Copenhagen and the central and western parts is further displayed in figures 5.6 and 5.7. The former shows the share of males with an academic degree. While every fourth male living in the north has an academic degree, only 2 - 7 % of the males living in the west has a similar education. In relation to educational training, the tendency is slightly towards larger inequality at municipal level. The latter figure shows the regional distribution of unemployment 1980, 1990 and 1999. During this period the unemployment level rose substantially about 1990 and started first to decline again in the mid 1990s. However, once more is the contrast demonstrated between the more privileged northern suburbs and the poorer western suburbs and central Copenhagen. Roughly speaking has unemployment, which turned the City of Copenhagen into a national concentration of unemployment, left the northern suburban areas untouched with unemployment levels significantly below national average and the western suburbs clearly above that level. A picture much similar to this reveals if the municipal income levels are studied: City of Copenhagen has, together with a few municipalities west of the city, the lowest income level at a level of 60 - 65 % of the top level represented by three municipalities to the north, cf figure 5.9. The relatively difference in income levels has not diminished during the last twenty years. The analysis further shows, that despite an effective equalization scheme, a huge public sector to compensate for market failures and a long lasting commitment to reduce social inequality, the differences remains at the same level, sometimes even increase. Copenhagen maintain a superior social division north - south: The upper middle class, that is the high income groups, the highly educated and the ones with the lowest unemployment level, is clearly located to the north of the city.

The analysis at municipal level thus demonstrates a clear relationship between urbanization and its demographic structure. The development of the central boomroughs before 1945 with a large share of 2 and 3 rooms flats, many at an insufficient level of refurbishment, has been basis for a strong push factor in relation to middle class families. In stead, they moved to the new, spacious and modern suburban areas during the second half of the 20th century. The selective processes, which guided the upper middle class households to the north and the lower middle class and working class households to the west, have also constructed the social differences of today metropolitan area. A landscape which now is being reproduced by property prices and types of housing available.

Although the overall picture has not changed much since 1980, i.e. that socio-spatial differences has not grown, the inequalities have neither diminished. The north - south divide remains and refers to social factors of decisive importance: Employment, education and income. The spatial pattern was from the start of the suburbanisation marked by a clear dichotomy. Despite the redistribution effects of the welfare state has this not been changed. The socio-spatial structuration of Copenhagen thus reflect the radial pattern suggested by Hoyt (1939), while the demographic development confirm the concentric structure proposed by Burgess (1925).

At this, municipal level, there are no signs of socio-spatial polarisation. The social differences and inequalities are ‘grounded’ through the built environment and here more than anything the housing market. Both of these processes are locally determined and thus only indirectly a consequence of globalisation. The combined effects of local institutional arrangements and external impact on a city can be revealed by a study of immigrant’s location. It appears that the immigration population generally is located in the least popular housing estates, often large scale, non-profit housing from the 1970s. A possible explanation of the missing growing spatial contrasts is the choice of scale. It may simply be the fact that the municipal level is too coarse to catch the social variations of the city. The rising social differences between different forms of tenure support this assumption. Thus, chapter six to eight analyses the socio-spatial changes at a more detailed scale in Copenhagen.

The socio-spatial structure at neighbourhood level

The impact of spatial scale can be examined by a more detailed analysis of changes at homogeneous residential level: about 160 neighbourhoods (i.e. small local areas dominated typically by one kind of tenure) studied here are scattered all over Greater Copenhagen, cf. figure 2.1. They have been delimited to naturally boundaries (if such could be found), often forming a certain type of housing - e.g. detached, semi-detached, multi-storey buildings, social housing, private ownership etc. The areas are selected in order to include as many aspects of social urban change as possible and thus includes neighbourhoods in the periphery, the inner city as well as the areas in between.

The 160 residential areas have been classified in respect to their decile quotient. The population of Greater Copenhagen has been ordered according to their income: the 10% with the lowest income make up decile 1, the next 10% decile 2 and so on. Then, for each neighborhood the number of people having an income belonging to decile 1, 2, 3 etc at metropolitan level is counted. Finally, the decile quotient is calculated as the number of income takers belonging to the lowest 20% (decile 1 and 2) in relation to the highest 20% (decile 9 and 10). Residential areas with a decile quotient around 1.0 are balanced, i.e. there will be an identical number of people with high and low incomes. Where the decile quotient is above or lower than 1, the neighbourhoods can be characterised as poor respectively affluent areas, cf. the table.

The decile quotient is a simple indicator for social balance at neighbourhood level. While the middle group - the balanced type of area - ranges from low
Designation of neighbourhoods | Decile quotient
---|---
Extreme high income | < 0.25
Very high income | 0.25 - 0.5
High income | 0.5 - 0.8
Above average | 0.8 - 1.25
Below average | 1.25 - 2.0
Low income | 2.0 - 4.0
Very low income | 4.0 - 10.0
Extreme low income | > 10.0

6.5. However, the other main household type, couples with children, has relatively declined during the same period and while they were abundant in 1981 in suburban areas, this is not the case anymore, cf figures 6.8 & 6.9. Only a few neighbourhoods have more than 20% of the households in this category. Labour market attachment is obvious a central issue for income and living standard; like the rest of the country, the economic activity rate has decreased for males and increased for females. However, immigrants from third world countries have a quite low and decreasing labour market participation rate. Moreover, the activity rate varies clearly with the income level of the residential areas. Those with the lowest income level has also the lowest activity rate, cf figure 7.3. A comparison between nationality and sex 1997 in relation to unemployment shows a remarkable difference between majority and minority population: The immigrants have either a substantial higher or lower unemployment level than the Danes. This doubletios is a result of the composition of the immigrant groups - some are refugees from third world countries, other are highly educated west Europeans and north Americans who fill a position in international firms and organisations, cf figure 7.7.

The differences in income and employment pattern match the educational difference, cf table 7.8 and figure 7.8. There is a marked over weight of highly educated living in the more affluent areas and an overrepresentation of low educated people in the poor areas. The connection between education, employment and income is a dominant factor in social position and determining for the urban location. The spatial income distribution in Copenhagen has been almost constant between central Copenhagen, the western and the northern suburbs during the 1980s and 1990s. However, this hide an importance change of the period: The affluent areas have become even more affluent from 1981 to 1997 while the poorer areas in 1981 have worsened their income position, cf figures 7.12 and 7.13. One the one hand, the figures reveals a rising income level to the north and at a minor level in the central city. On the other hand, areas west of Copenhagen have many cases experienced declining income level. The maps thus shows a socio-spatial polarisation at local level.

The separation of income groups during the last decades are also visible when the relatively distribution of high income and low income earners are compared for 1981 and 1997, figure 7.14: As expected, the high earning groups were predominately found in areas with high or very high income level and more rarely in areas with low income level. However, during the 16 years, the distribution of both high and low income earners have become more unequal. High earners concentrate to the already privileged neighbourhoods and the low income groups concentrate in less privileged areas. A characteristic of all neighbourhoods are shown in figure 7.13: the extremes of the distribution - areas with either very low or very high income level have grown considerably, while the former dominant groups of moderate income level have diminished clearly. This segregation is also evident from table 7.18, that shows the segregation level of high and low income earners. It is worth to notice, that the general segregation level has increase some what in the 1980s and then stabilised, but also that the highest segregation level is found among high income earners, not the low income group.

The number of immigrants within the selected neighbourhoods have doubled during the period like the rest of the city, cf table 6.9. A major part of that increase comes from refugees and family reunification. The immigrants are clearly segregated in Copenhagen, again the 1980s appears to be a period of growing differences and immigrants segregation index rose from 44.6 to 94.4 and was then a bit reduced during the 1990s, of table 6.10. The result of this segregation is a substantial concentration to the poorest neighbourhoods, of table 6.11. While 40% of the immigrants lived in low or very low income neighbourhoods in 1981, this share has increased to 54% in 1997. Immigrants made up 80% of the population in the poorest areas in 1997 (table 6.11). This points at the housing market as a key factor behind segregation.

The income distribution among different types of tenure can be seen from table 8.2: the extreme overweight of low incomes in colleges cannot be surprising. However, colleges are a special kind of dwelling. A close examination of the table reveals a surprising growth in the decile quotient among social (non-private) housing. From the beginning, the income level was clearly among the lowest, but it has relatively declined during the following decades. In 1997 was low income groups represented in social housing more than three times the level for all kinds of housing. Compare this to ownership housing that have half the average number of low income earners. This relatively worsening of the income level in social housing is an important indicator of rising social differentiation between various kinds of tenure (labelled ‘socio-tenure polarisation’ by Hamnett, 1984). Table 8.4 shows that the households are uneven distributed between different forms of tenure. Singles with and without children are strongly concentrated to social housing and flats, while families are found mostly in detached housing. An alternative way to examine the degree of polarisation is developed by Dorling & Woodward, 1996. They define polarisation “… a widening gap between individuals, households or groups of people in terms of their economic and social circumstances and opportunities.” Although in line with most ordinary use of the term, it is also a weak definition which allows a wide range of interpretations and thus risk to bring more confusion than clarity. Their objective is to uncover the socio-spatial pattern in relation to the polarisation thesis: Does important social conditions develop towards rising spatial separation, i.e. socio-spatial polarisation, or not? Dorling & Woodward, 1996 examine the frequency of families with children, age structure, economic activity rate, unemployment level.
Conclusion: Stability and change

Globalisation, an abundant deindustrialisation and subsequent transformation of labour market and demand for labour market qualifications have produced a number of serious changes in most European cities. The rise of inner city neighbourhoods (gentrification) and the decline of the former successful suburbs have many been a clear sign of an urban transformation.

The detailed examination of Copenhagen shows a complex socio-spatial pattern, that in some relations indicate a clear polarisation, in others the opposite. However, although it is not a simple picture, the significant social factors such as employment, education, income and family status, points in a direction of growing dissimilarities. But it does not seem to remove the general urban structure of socio-economic sectors radiating from the city centre and life cycles forming concentric circles.

The examination of the selected eight metropoles in north-western Europe shows many similarities in their development, although the pace and timing differ. Copenhagen was caught in a low growth trap during the late 1980s and early 1990s due to national priorities; however, since the mid-1990s Copenhagen has been a city in constant and fast growth. This has had an impact on the industrial structure and thus at labour market and social conditions. First of all, the late 1990s have experienced a sharp increase in employment that has reduced the high unemployment level among unskilled workers in Copenhagen. However, as the economic growth is selective, that is pushed forward by a few economic sectors, the distribution of wealth is definitely influenced by this growth. During the boom of first half of the 1980s, the income differences rose and then stagnated during the recession (1987-93).

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the socio-spatial changes in north-west European city (Copenhagen) during a period of fast economic and social transformations. While the socio-spatial pattern at a superior level remains unchanged, the polarisation has developed quickly at a much smaller scale, the neighbourhood level. The decisive cause seems not to be the globalisation processes, but rather the ageing of the population. During this period, the age composition of inner city districts have shifted from old to young people and in contrast have some suburban areas seen a sharp decline in young families and rise in single and elderly people. These changes have decisive impact at the local economy as well as at municipal service and tax level. The materialisation of social inequalities takes place through the urban landscape in practice the housing market that holds a key role in relation to segregation.

The housing market in Copenhagen has moved towards residualisation of socially rented dwellings and a 'flight' to the ownership sector by middle class families. This change has lasted for several decades, but since the 1980s the least attractive estates at the periphery developed towards rising poverty, fewer employed and families. In stead they became excluded spaces. However, the effects of the mid-1990-boom has been drastic increases in property prices and a substantial part of the population today would in fact not be able to buy the dwellings they own. This propels newcomers at the housing market to seek accommodation still further away or at a lower quality. One certain consequence is the exclusion of low income groups from the ordinary housing market, thus they are forced to settle in social housing. The result has been a widening gap between ownership and rental housing (residualisation).

The steady growth in the number of immigrants is an independent factor in shaping the social landscape of West European cities: All the selected cities have a substantial and rising number of immigrants and refugees living in the least attractive parts. The immigrants often have the lowest income and the weakest relations to the labour market, thus their housing conditions.
The urban structures have an important impact on social and economic transformations. They moderate the extent and pace of transformations through the high inertia of the built environment. The socio-spatial structure of cities is therefore not only a reflection of social, economic and political relations, but also of the material landscape the city is made of. Despite the many claims for a postindustrial or postmodern city, the contemporary city seems to be quite like the old industrial city regarding its general structures.

**Litteratur**


